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Abstract. Several investigations have been developed around analogies
based reasoning in diﬀerent domains, however the analogy between ar-
guments has not been deeply explored. A semiformal way to express
these patterns of reasoning were proposed by Walton, through argument
schemes from analogy. From this, it is possible to propose computable
approximations for comparing arguments. In this paper we introduce a
formalism based on the comparison of arguments through descriptors or
labels which describes an aspect that the argument refers to. This for-
malism allows us classifying similar arguments considering the natural
descriptors of them, in a speciﬁc context.
Keywords: Analogies Based Reasoning, Argumentation Scheme, De-
scriptors, Context Domain.
1 Introduction
The Argument from Analogy [30, 19] represents a very common form of everyday
human reasoning. Brieﬂy speaking, two cases are analyzed for similarities and dif-
ferences between them, using a form of inductive inference where the similarities
between the cases lead to postulate a further not yet conﬁrmed similarity. The
argumentation from analogy allows to solve a new case based on already solved
cases. Numerous investigations have been developed around analogies based rea-
soning, which are based on establishing the similarities and diﬀerences between
a known object -that is part of knowledge base of agents- and another new but
which has certain known aspects [20, 26]. In multi-agents systems domain, when
an intelligent agents need to solve a certain problem or take a decision, it is
common for them to seek into their knowledge base for solutions from previous
similar problems, where the context information ﬁts both the new and the known
problem. This reasoning process is guided by thought patterns and involves an
argumentation process, i.e., a process by which reasons are given in favour of a
particular conclusion.
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The analogy between arguments has not been deeply explored. Any com-
parison process requires the deﬁnition of the context in which such comparison
acquires signiﬁcance. Meanwhile, as the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) carries
out research in computational argumentation to achieve useful systems based on
common sense, it seems desirable and reasonable to try to formalize the analogy
between arguments. In general, this context is formed by conditions or variables
that govern the comparison process, all of which have diﬀerent importance de-
grees and need to be ordered to carry out the process in an eﬀective manner.
Consider the following situation where a person needs a recommendation about
edible seeds intake being beneﬁcial to improve its health. The recommendation
system compare the common properties of the edible seeds, their beneﬁts, and
contraindications. To accomplish this, the system’s reasoning process must ﬁnd
items to compare alternatives, i.e., some common descriptors to the options un-
der consideration. This example describes a particular pattern of reasoning that
is used in order to reach a goal or a conclusion. This pattern of reasoning was
called Argument from Analogy, and have been expressed in a semiformal way by
Walton [31, 30] using a set of critical questions.
In a general sense, argumentation can be associated with an interactive pro-
cess where arguments for and against conclusions are oﬀered with the purpose
of determining which conclusions are acceptable [27]. Several argument-based
formalisms have considered an argument like as abstract entity without inter-
nal structure [11, 9], while other works that specify concrete forms of building
arguments [3, 24, 12]. In addition, there exist some argumentative formalisms
that represent the attributes associated to arguments providing more informa-
tion to determine arguments acceptability [2, 8, 5]. However, these formalisms
do not deal with the problem of classifying similar arguments considering the
natural descriptors inherent to each argument. In this work, we will propose an
Argumentation Scheme that that allows to considerer the context of compari-
son between arguments, based on a set of descriptors that are common to the
arguments that are being analyzed. In this way, we will determine and represent
analogies between arguments. This paper is structured as follows: a brief intro-
duction to the analogy concept is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we review
the Argumentation Scheme proposed by Walton and, in Section 4, contains the
core contribution of the paper, there the Context-Aware Scheme is formally pre-
sented. Finally, in Section 5 we present the relevant related work, the conclusions
and future work.
2 The Concept of Analogy
The term analogy has been widely studied as to their meaning and usage [13,
23]. Hesse [15] argues that the word is self-explanatory and that two objects
or situations are similar if they share some properties and diﬀer in others, and
put forward that the analogy is a concept inherent in the modelling process,
between a portion of the real world and its model or description, as a relation-
ship that ﬁnds similarities and diﬀerences between both. Walton [30] agrees with
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this perspective adding that two things are similar when they are visibly sim-
ilar or they look similar. Gentner [13] linked the concept of analogies with the
representation of the agent’s knowledge through the pattern’s repetition. First,
these patterns should be identiﬁed to ﬁnd relations of correspondence with new
situations. Then, it is important to perform a mapping of domains so that these
relations of correspondence do not produce a fallacious reasoning. Under this
meaning the analogy is considered as a process which recovers information from
a known situation to compare it with a new one and evaluate whether to apply
the same solution according to the structure of the both situations. As to how to
determine when two arguments are similar, Walton points out that it is not easy
to clearly deﬁne the comparison between arguments as this requires interpreting
the similarities and diﬀerences between them at various levels. Oﬀering another
view, Carbonell [7] proposes a technique based on how we solve problems. This
technique takes into account previous experience information useful for solving a
new problem, as long as both occur in similar contexts. In [28], Sowa argues that
it is possible to make a comparison between arguments establishing a function
of similarity or correspondence between them. In a parallel eﬀort, Cecchi et al.
in [10] characterized and formalized relationships that capture the behavior of
a preference criterion among arguments; while this does not refer speciﬁcally
to arguments from analogy, it shows the usefulness in approaching the analogy
between two arguments as a binary relation.
Considering the variety of concepts presented, we can say that the analogy is
a process that involves the comparison between two entities, for example, objects
that look similar, cases, or two arguments in which similarities and diﬀerences
are interpreted. The critical component in this process is the deﬁnition of the
conditions under which carry out such comparison. Clearly, the analogical com-
parison process have received diﬀerent answers and remain the focus of diﬀerent
research lines. The similarity is related to the properties shared between two ob-
jects or situations being compared. However, the comparison of two arguments
depends on the agent’s perception, which can be inﬂuenced by the agent’s be-
liefs, goals, or external variables. All these factors are considered as a context
that governs the mapping of two arguments in order to establish similarities and
diﬀerences between them. The intuition that we have just presented is essential
to deﬁne a context-aware scheme which is based on the argumentation scheme
from analogy proposed by Walton [31, 30], to which we will refer below.
3 Argumentation Schemes from Analogy
A more applied perspective referring to the pattern of reasoning which appeal to
analogies addressed by Walton [31, 30], who proposed an Argumentation Scheme
from Analogy consist of a set of questions, premises and conclusions that describe
a pattern of human thought [29]. Speciﬁcally, the pattern of reasoning based on
analogies. compares two situations C1 and C2 (or cases, as Walton refers to them
in the setting of law) to ﬁnd similarities and diﬀerences between them. In this
pattern of thought, C1 is the source case or known case and C2 is the target case
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or new case [31]. Two cases may be similar in a given context, but they may be
diﬀerent in another. The general pattern of this scheme is presented bellow [31]:
- Similarity premise: C1 is similar to C2 (Generally)
- Base premise: A proposition A is true (false) in C1
- Conclusion: A is true (false) in C2
The defeasible character is introduced by the speciﬁc diﬀerences between C1
and C2. Walton deﬁned three critical questions that are appropriate for using
the scheme of argument from analogy:
1. Are there diﬀerences between C1 and C2 that would tend to undermine the force
of the similarity cited?
2. Is the feature A true (false) in C1?
3. Is there some other case C3 also similar to C1, but in which the feature A is false
(true)?
Walton [30] analyzed diﬀerent possibilities for this type of schema, for exam-
ple the usage of argument from classiﬁcation and the argument from precedent
applied in case-based reasoning by the use of a dialogue structure. Another rep-
resentation is detailed by [22] that considers a relationship in which the objects
are instantiated as arguments that maintain an analogical proportion, and that
can be expressed as a diﬀers from b as c diﬀers from d, either, a is similar to b as c
is similar to d, where a, b, c, and d are entities or situations of any kind including
arguments. In both cases, the representation schemes refer to the comparison of
situations, entities, or cases that may implicitly contain arguments, where a con-
text constraint plays a determinant role but it is not explicitly deﬁned. Then, we
propose below a deﬁnition of a context-aware scheme that allows us to compare
two arguments with the intention of ﬁnd similarities and diﬀerences between
them. This approach is based on the exhaustive deﬁnition of constraint set or
context constraint inherent of the comparison process between arguments.
4 A Context-Aware Scheme
An alternative to deﬁne the analogy relation between two arguments as a com-
putable approximation, is to make the comparison based on a set of descriptors
associated with the arguments. The use of these descriptors will allow to es-
tablish of similarity and diﬀerence degree between the arguments into account
and formalize an argumentation schemes. We will develop these insights below,
considering the following motivation example previously.
Example 1 Consider the following set of arguments: A = {A,B,C,D} where:
A To incorporate chia seeds to your diet is a healthy choice since they are rich in veg-
etal fats, proteins, antioxidants, and minerals. This seeds helps to reduce conditions
such as oxidative stress.
B Amaranth seeds provide vitamin A, E, from the B group, calcium, iron, and phos-
phorus. So this seeds help us in preventing deﬁciency anemia.
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C Sesame seeds provide high quantity of calcium, antioxidants, fatty acids, and pro-
teins. Therefore, to ingest sesame seeds is important in preventing osteoporosis.
D Chia seeds are harmful to hypotensive individuals because it lowers blood pressure.
Therefore, it is not always healthy to incorporate them into the daily diet.
We want to propose a method that allows to determine the set of similar ar-
guments among themselves, according to a given context. In general, this method
consists of the following four stage: (i) Speciﬁcation of argument’s descriptors;
(ii) Setting the context constraint based on argument’s descriptors; (iii) Deﬁ-
nition of a preference relation over the context constraint ; and (iv) Computing
similarity quotient among the arguments being compared. Next, we describe each
stage of this procedure, in order to clarify the proposed reasoning process.
4.1 Speciﬁcation of Argument’s Descriptors
The set of argument’s descriptors is constituted by words or a labels describing
aspects that the argument is referring to. In this sense, we assume the existence of
a universe of descriptors denoted with D, where the set of descriptors associated
with an argument A is denote with desc(A) such that desc(A) ⊆ D.
Example 2 An example of a universe of descriptors for a nutritional/health related
knowledge base that contains the argument set A of the Example 1 could be the set D =
{type of food, health beneﬁts, dietary contribution, health risks}. Given the Argument A
we could specify the following descriptors: desc(A) = {type of food, health beneﬁts} stat-
ing that the arguments refer to a particular type of food, speciﬁc contributions to a diet,
and the beneﬁts of its consumption to ones’ health. From the perspective of analogical
proportion argument A is similar to argument B as the argument C is the argument D,
if we consider that the ﬁrst two refer to ingestion of eggs while the latter two refer to
the intake of seeds.
Find the descriptors embedded in the arguments involves technical practice
of argumentation mining which are being widely investigated [17, 18, 21].
4.2 Setting the Context Constraint
A context constraint speciﬁes conditions under which arguments can be com-
pared. In this sense, two arguments can only be compared if they share at least
some descriptors. We can present the following deﬁnition, based on the compara-
bility of two arguments. In the rest of the paper, whenever there is no ambiguity,
we will refer to context constraints simply as contexts.
Deﬁnition 1 (Context Constraint) Let D a set of descriptors. A context
constraint, denoted as ∆, is a subset of D that represent the relevant aspects
to perform the arguments comparison in a particular domain.
Example 3 Continuing with the setting of the Example 2, the elements deﬁned in
D could be instantiated as follows. Let ∆1 = {type of food, dietary contribution} be a
context indicating that two arguments can be compared in this environment whenever
they refer to a type of food and dietary contributions of this food. Other contexts could
be ∆2 = {health beneﬁts}.
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We can observe that there is at least one item in ∆ which prevails in the com-
parison between two arguments (in this example could be type of food), while
there are other elements in ∆ which indicate properties that can take the null
value (for example, health beneﬁts). This implies that we must establish a pref-
erence relation among the elements of ∆ to compute this type of information.
We will refer to them below.
4.3 Deﬁnition of a Preference Relation over the Context
When the context has more than one descriptor, it is necessary to establish some
order among elements in order to carry out the comparison of the arguments
more accurately, which can be expressed as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Preference between Descriptors) Let ν1, ν2 ∈ ∆ be descrip-
tors of arguments. Let pref be a preference relation between ν1 and ν2. We says
that (ν1, ν2) ∈ pref iﬀ ν1 is a prevailing condition to make the comparison be-
tween arguments, i.e. ν1 cannot take the value null, and there is no ν2 ∈ ∆ such
that ν2 has the opposite meaning to ν1 given to ν1 is a fundamental descriptor.
This preference relation can be speciﬁed in various ways according to the
domain being modelled. For example, weights or probability values can be as-
signed to the descriptors, or a partial order relation between descriptors could be
established. Once descriptors, the context, and the preference relation between
descriptors were deﬁned, we can compute the similarities and diﬀerences between
two arguments. However, it should be noted that descriptors take values for an
argument in particular. Thus, we should consider some mapping function µ that
establishes the relation between each descriptor in ∆ and the set of concepts to
which the argument is referring to– these concepts could, for instance, be just
words in natural language or more complex concepts in an ontology. We will
not focus on formalizing these concepts; however, intuitively, we can say that
using the mapping function it is possible obtain the set of words or concepts
that a given argument A ∈ A refers to. As an example of how to formalize such
a function, it could be based on the intensional relational structure, or concep-
tualization presented in [14] as a triple consisting of a universe of discourse, a set
of possible worlds or values that characterize a system, and a set of conceptual
relations on two previous ones. With all these elements in place, we can compute
the similarities between two arguments, which will detail below.
4.4 Computing Similarity Quotient among Arguments
To decide if two arguments are analogous, we propose to evaluate the values
that take their descriptors. If the descriptors with matching values exceeds the
descriptors with diﬀerent values, and the prevailing conditions are fulﬁlled, the
arguments are considered analogous. Otherwise, the arguments are considered
diﬀerent. This involves calculating a similarity quotient between the values of
argument’s descriptors that are being compared.
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Deﬁnition 3 (Similarity Quotient) Let A,B ∈ A be two arguments to be
compared, ∆ be a context orderer by a preference relation pref, and µ be a map-
ping function. We deﬁne the similarity quotient αµ(A,B) as:
0 ≤ | µ(A) ∩ µ(B) || µ(A) ∩ µ(B) | ≤ 1
where | µ(A) ∩ µ(B) | must be diﬀerent to 0.
A null divisor in our case means that if the arguments under comparison
do not have diﬀerences, it makes no sense consider an analogy between them,
but rather an identity in the context used.It is important to remark that in
this approach, there is no diﬀerence in calculating αµ(A,B), or αµ(B,A), i.e.,
we assume that similarity quotient is symmetric. With these elements in place,
we can now propose a notion of analogy between arguments. Intuitively, we
considerer that two arguments A and B are analogous iﬀ the similarity quotient
is is greater than 0.5. According to previous deﬁnitions, this implies that the
arguments being compared under a interest context and and all the prevailing
conditions are fulﬁlled. The following deﬁnition formalizes the notion analogy
relation between arguments that we adhere to in this work, and it is a reﬁning
of the one presented in [6].
Deﬁnition 4 (Analogy Relation) Let A be a set of arguments, ∆ be a con-
text orderer by a preference relation, and αµ be a similarity quotient between two
arguments in A. An analogy relation, denoted R∆, is deﬁned as R∆ ⊆ A × A,
where (A,B) ∈ R∆ iﬀ αµ(A,B) > 0.5, all the prevailing conditions are ful-
ﬁlled, and veriﬁes that: (i) R∆(A,B) = R∆(B,A); (ii) R∆(A,A) = 1; and (iii)
R∆(A,B) = 0 Iﬀ µ(A) ∩ µ(B) = ∅.
Example 4 Picking up the Example 3, we need to center on the value that each of the
descriptors takes for every argument, according to the context ∆. For this comparison,
we take a context ∆ = {dietary contribution}. In this case, the similarity quotient
regarding ∆ could be calculated for A, B and C in A, using the number of descriptors of
the arguments A and C who take the same value, over the number of descriptors of those
arguments that take diﬀerent values. In the same way we proceeded with the arguments
B and C. Arguments A and C are analogous in this context because αµ(A,C) = 0.5.
However, arguments B and C are not analogous in this context, due to αµ(B,C) = 0.33.
Note that we make no assumption about the relation to be transitive; this is,
if A R∆ B and B R∆C, then not necessarily must the case that A R∆C. It may
happen that αµ(A,B)>0.5, αµ(B,C)>0.5 and αµ(A,C)<0.5. Clariﬁed the mean-
ing of the analogy between arguments, we can deﬁne below an argumentation
scheme based on context information.
Deﬁnition 5 (Context-Aware Scheme) Let A be a set of arguments, ∆ be a
context orderer by a preference relation, and αµ be a similarity quotient between
two arguments A and B ∈ A. The context-aware scheme is deﬁned as:
- Similarity premise: A is analogous to B
91
- Base premise: µ(A) = P , where P is the descriptor’s value for A
- Conclusion: µ(B) = P , , where P is the descriptor’s value for B.
In this scheme, the similarity premise implies that the analogy relation be-
tween two arguments is grater than the diﬀerence between them, considering
a orderer context. The comparison between arguments is given to for the pre-
vailing conditions and the rest of the descriptors which are interesting in the
context. The defeasible character is introduced by the context under which the
arguments are compared:
1. Exist ∆0 that would tend to undermine the force of the analogy cited?
2. Is the descriptor P ∈ ∆0 true and is P a prevailing condition?
When considering the original critical questions deﬁned by Walton, the sim-
ilarity between two cases can be questioned. In the context-aware scheme, the
analogy is established considering a speciﬁc context for comparison. The ﬁrst
thing that it is possible to question is whether the comparison context that has
been considered is the right. Then, its possible to question about the preference
relation in the context.
Example 5 Continuing the example that we have been developing, we have:
- Similarity Premise: A is analogous to C, considering ∆ = {type of food}.
- Base premise: µ(A) = {seeds}.
- Conclusion: µ(C) = {seeds}.
We can evaluate what happens when we take the context ∆0 = {dietary contributions},
due to µ(A) = {vegetal fats, proteins, antioxidants,minerals} and µ(C) = {calcium,
antioxidants, proteins, fatty acids}.
In addition to particularize the analogy between arguments, the context-
aware scheme presented is useful to give a new meaning to relations between
arguments when they are considered abstract entities without internal structure,
which will be addressed in future work.
5 Related Works and Conclusions
Few studies exist formalizing the argumentation schemes proposed by Wal-
ton. Amgoud [1] put forward that argumentation from analogies has not been
exploited proﬁtably by AI, being the structure-mapping model [4] the excep-
tion. Nevertheless, any attempt to deal with the use of analogies in the argu-
mentative process should include three aspects: the diﬀerence of an argumen-
tative process from analogies with the argumentative process in general, the
deﬁnition of attacks and the evaluation of arguments in this new approach.
Prakken [24] proposed Argumentation Systems with Structured Arguments,
which used the structure of arguments and external preference information to
deﬁne the a defeat relation. Regarding argumentation schemes, Prakken [25] pro-
poses that modeling reasoning using argumentation schemes necessarily involves
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developing a method combining issues of non-monotonic logic and dialogue sys-
tems.Regarding to preference relation between arguments, Cecchi et al. [10] de-
ﬁned this as a binary relation considering two particular criteria, speciﬁcity and
equi-speciﬁcity, together with priorities between rules, deﬁning preferred argu-
ments and incomparable arguments. Speciﬁcally, with regards to formalizing
argumentation schemes, Hunter [16] presented a framework for meta-reasoning
about object-level arguments allowing the presentation of richer criteria for de-
termining whether an object-level argument is warranted. These criteria can
use meta-information corresponding to the arguments, including the proponents
and their provenances and an axiomatization using this framework for reasoning
about the appropriated conduct of the experts introducing them.
We have presented a formalism based on the comparison of arguments through
descriptors. A descriptor is a word or a label that describes an aspect or element
that the argument refers to. The arguments can be compared if they share a set
of descriptors that represent the context of comparison. In order to compare the
arguments, we have deﬁned an analogy relation that considers the similarities
and diﬀerences between arguments under certain context. We have formulated a
Context-Aware Scheme based on Scheme from Analogy proposed by Walton [31,
29]. The goal of this formalization is to make it more useful to use reasoning pat-
terns based on similarities and diﬀerence arguments in the ﬁeld of AI. Diﬀerent
instruments can be speciﬁed to establish the comparison of the arguments, for
example, the descriptors. Regardless of the type of instrument used, comparisons
adjusted to a particular context allow us to add common sense to the reason-
ing of the agent. Among the main future work to address we can mention the
speciﬁcation of the maapping function between arguments and the deﬁnition of
a framework that makes this type of schemes more useful for AI.
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